In Steiner tree game associated with a graph G = (V; E), players consist of a subset N ⊆ V of nodes. The characteristic function value of a subset S ⊆ N of the players is the minimum weight of a Steiner tree that spans S. We show that it is NP-hard to determine whether a Steiner tree game is totally balanced, i.e., cores for all its subgames are non-empty. In addition, the NP-hardness result is also proven for deciding whether the core is non-empty, or whether an imputation is a member of the core. ?
Introduction
where x(S) = i∈S x i . The study of the core is closely associated with another important concept, the balanced set. The collection B of subsets S of N is balanced if there exists a set of positive numbers S , S ∈ B, such that for each i ∈ N , we have i∈S∈B S = 1. A game (N; v) is called balanced if S∈B S v(S) ¿ v(N ) holds for every balanced collection B with weights { S : S ∈ B}. Bondareva [2] and Shapley [16] proved that a game has a non-empty core if and only if it is balanced.
For a subset S ⊆ N , we deÿne the induced subgame (S; v S ) on S: v S (T ) = v(T ) for every subset T of S. A cooperative game is called totally balanced if all its subgames are balanced, i.e., all its subgames have non-empty cores. This concept was introduced by Shapley and Shubik [17] in the study of market games. They showed that the collection of market games are the same as the collection of totally balanced games. Several other classes of cooperative games were also shown to be equivalent to totally balanced games, such as, the maximum ow game introduced by Kalai and Zemel [13] and the linear production game discussed by Owen [15] and Curiel [3] . Recently, Deng et al. [6] considered total balancedness of some interesting combinatorial optimization games. They presented a complete characterization for a class of partition games to be totally balanced, and the relationship between some totally balanced games and their related combinatorial structures. Most were shown to be polynomially decidable. The worst complexity for totally balanced conditions is obtained for a coloring game, for which total balancedness was shown to be equivalent to a graph being perfect. The total balancedness condition is a very strong requirement (core being non-empty for all subgames), and it was challenged to ÿnd an example for which no polynomial time algorithm is known to decide total balancedness [4] . In this work we show this is true for Steiner tree games if NP is not the same as P.
Steiner tree games were introduced by Megiddo [14] . Suppose that there is a central supplier o ering service to a set of consumers through a given network. It is required to connect all the consumers to the central supplier. The connection is not limited to use direct links between two consumers or a consumer and the central supplier, it may pass through additional nodes, called switches, in the network. We wish to construct a cheapest connection and distribute the connection cost among the consumers fairly. 
The class of monotone MCST games is a subclass of Steiner tree games only under the restriction that the set of switches is empty. Bird [1] , and independently, Granot and Huberman [11] presented a proof for the non-emptyness of the core for both MCST game and monotone MCST game: Find a minimum cost spanning tree T of G and allocate to player i ∈ N the weight of the ÿrst edge that i encounters on the path from i to v 0 in T . Di erent from these two games, the core of Steiner tree game may in general be empty. An example with empty core was given in Megiddo [14] . On the other hand, Granot and Maschler [12] showed that, if there exist an optimal spanning tree T G , which spans the nodes of all consumers and all switches, such that no two switches are adjacent in T G , then the core of the corresponding Steiner tree game is not empty.
The computational complexity as a rationality measure for game theoretical concepts has attracted more and more attention recently. Various interesting complexity structures have started to emerge as a result, especially for the study of the core. Deng and Papadimitriou [7] found a game for which the core is non-empty if and only if a certain imputation (Shapley value in this case) is in the core. For the MCST game, the core is always non-empty and a member in the core can be found in polynomial time [11] ; however, Faigle, et al. [8] show that membership testing is co-NP-complete. Deng et al. [5] discussed the complexity of the core for a class of combinatorial optimization games. Goemans and Skutella [10] recently showed that, for a facility location game, if the core is non-empty, a solution in the core can be found in polynomial time, and membership testing can be done in polynomial time. However, it is NP-complete to decide if a core is not empty.
In Section 2, we show it is NP-hard to decide whether a Steiner tree game is totally balanced, it is the ÿrst example of NP-hardness for the totally balanced condition. In Section 3, we prove that, given an imputation of a Steiner tree game, checking if it belongs to the core is also NP-hard.
Complexity of testing total balancedness
In this section, we prove that the problem of testing total balancedness of the Steiner tree game is NP-hard. And because of the speciÿc reduction we constructed, the result also holds for the problem of testing non-emptyness of the core. In our proof, we will use 3-PARTITION, which is shown to be NP-complete in strong sense in the book of Garey and Johnson [9] .
3-PARTITION is deÿned as follows:
Instance: A ÿnite set A = {a 1 ; a 2 ; : : : ; a 3m }, a bound B ∈ Z + , and a size: s(a) ∈ Z + for each a ∈ A, such that (2) The construction of edge (u 0 ; v 0 ) is to ensure that for any proper subset of N , the vertices in R are not needed in the corresponding minimum Steiner tree. (II) We show that the cores of all proper subgames of (G) are non-empty. Let S be any proper subset of N , |S| 6 3m − 1. Assume that T S = (V S ; E S ) is the minimum Steiner tree of G w.r.t. S ∪ {v 0 }, then it must be the case
where the set Q ∈ Q is an arbitrary set containing S. That is, E S consists of one edge in E 4 and |S| edges in E 2 , v(S) = 6mB|S| + 5 3 B|S| + mB − 1 3 B:=v * S :
It is easy to verify that it is an element in the core of (G S ).
(III) We prove that the game (G) has non-empty core if and only if A has a 3-partition.
Assume that T = (V N ; E N ) is the minimum Steiner tree of Let x(a) = 6mB + 2B; ∀a ∈ N . By formula (2.1), it is easy to verify that it is a core member of (G). If A has no 3-partition, suppose the core of (G) is not empty and x ∈ Core( (G)). Since x(N ) = v(N ) ¿ 18m 2 B + 6mB, there must be a (3m − 1)-element subset Q * of N such that
which is contrary to our hypothesis that x ∈ Core( (G)). Therefore, the (G) is totally balanced if and only if A has 3-PARTITION. Also the construction of (G) can be carried out in polynomial time, so testing total balancedness of Steiner tree games is NP-hard.
From the proof of Theorem 2.1, we can get the complexity on testing balancedness obviously.
Corollary 2.2. Testing balancedness for Steiner tree games is NP-hard.
Complexity of checking membership
Faigle et al. [8] proved that the problem of checking membership in the core for MCST games is co-NP-complete. Much in the spirit of their proof, we will show that checking membership in the core for Steiner tree games is co-NP-hard, even for a balanced game. Fig. 2 ). Denote the Steiner tree game on the weighted graph G by (G) = (N; v).
Our construction of graph G is much similar to that in Faigle et al. [8] . The only di erence is the weights of edges in E 3 . The weights of edges in E 3 are su ciently large so that each vertex in N X does not serve as a switch in the minimum Steiner tree of G. For any coalition S ⊆ N , denote the minimum Steiner tree w.r.t. S ∪ {v 0 } by T S = (V S ; E S ). We have it is easy to verify that y ∈ Core( (G)), this game is balanced. Deÿne x ∈ R n be a candidate for a core member
x(u i ) = q ∀i = 1; 2; : : : ; |F|;
x(v j ) = 2q + 2; ∀j = 1; 2; : : : ; 3q:
We shall claim that x is not in Core( (G)) if and only if F contains an exact cover for X . Assume x is not in Core( (G)), and let S ⊆ N be a coalition satisfying x(S) ¿ v(S). Then S must possess the following properties:
(1) |S ∩ N F | = q. If |S ∩ N F | ¿ q + 1, then by formulas (3.2) and (3.3) we have 0 ¡ x(S) − v(S) 6 |S ∩ N X | − 3q, which is contrary to the fact that |S ∩ N X | 6 3q. Hence |S ∩ N F | 6 q. Since each vertex in N F is adjacent only to 3 vertices in N X , |S ∩ N X | 6 3|S ∩ N F |. So by formula (3.1), we have 0 ¡ x(S) − v(S) 6 |S ∩ N X | − |S ∩ N F | − (2q − 1) 6 2|S ∩ N F | − (2q − 1); implying |S ∩ N F | ¿ q. Therefore, |S ∩ N F | = q.
(2) |S ∩ N X | = 3q. Suppose that |S ∩ N X | = k, by the analysis of (2) and formula (3.1), we have 0 ¡ x(S) − v(S) = k − 3q + 1, it implies that k = 3q.
Therefore, the assumption of x ∈ Core( (G)) implies F contains an exact cover of X .
On the other hand, if F admits an exact 3-cover F = {f i1 ; f i2 ; : : : ; f iq }, let S = {u i k : k = 1; 2; : : : ; q} ∪ N X , then v(S) = 7q 2 + 6q − 1 ¡ 7q 2 + 6q = x(S), which implies that x is not in Core( (G)).
Our construction of game (G) and the candidate core member x can be carried out in polynomial time, the proof is ÿnished.
